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In Doni (2006) the case of the secrecy of the information (S1)
has been incorrectly analysed. According to our assumption, the
sellers’ strategy were equal to:
This hypothesis was wrong and the mistake was due to a
misunderstanding
1. In fact such a strategy would be optimal if the
procurer (P) adopted a first price auction as a selection
mechanism.
The aim of this note is twofold: in the first place, by taking
advantage of our mistake, we want to analyse a new selection
policy (S0), in which the P awards the contract on the basis of a
reverse, first price, auction. We then compare it with the other
two policies analysed in the original paper: multidimensional
auction with a private (S2) or public (S3) revelation of the P’s
quality evaluation. Subsequently, we give an intuition of how the
bidders’ optimal strategy in the S1 game differs from the one
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1 Luckyly, the main results of the paper were not affected by this mistake. The
only proposition that is no longer valid is proposition 3, p. 260. Moreover, graph
2 is wrong and observation 1 is not clearly supported in the paper.If the P adopts the S0 strategy, he then selects the seller with
the lowest cost, whatever her quality level may be. Therefore, a
small advantage in the cost level would allow a bidder to win the
auction even if her quality level were really lower than that of her
opponent. This observation can be synthesised as follows:
Observation 0: if the P uses the S0 strategy, then the auction
mechanism is not necessarily efficient, since it can assign the
contract to the rival bidder who has a lower valuation.
It is possible to compare S0 and  S2 by calculating the P’s
expected utility in the two cases. Assuming N bidders we know
that if the P adopts a first price auction ( S0) we obtain:
E[U(S0)] = E[qi – p(ci)]       where ci < cj ∀i, j = 1,..., N;
since qi and ci are assumed to be independent, we get:
E[U(S0)] = E(q) – E[p(cmin)]
Thanks to the well known properties of first price auctions,
we can replace the expected price of the winning bidder with the
expected cost of the second lowest cost seller. Using the classical
notation of order statistics, we can write:
E[U(S0)] = E(q) – E[c(2)]
As far as strategy S2 is concerned, in the original paper we
have shown that the sellers’ equilibrium strategies resemble the
ones that would be adopted in a first price auction, where the
generic bidder i valuation is equal to vi = (qi – ci) and her bid is
equal to si = (qi – pi). Consequently, the P’s  expected utility
coincides with the expected value of the score offered by the
winning bidder. As the bidders’ valuations are IPV, we can be sure
that this value is equivalent to the expected value of the second
most efficient seller. Therefore we can write:
E[U(S2)]= E[v(N-1)]
Thanks to a recent paper of Engelbrecht et al. (2007) we can
easily compare S0 and S2:
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is sufficently large, then E[U(S0)] < E[U(S2)].
PROOF: see Engelbrecht et al. (2007), propositions 1 and 2, p.
632.
Thanks to our propositions 1 and 2, we also know that if N
= 2, S3 strictly dominates S2, given mild conditions on Fc(c).
Unfortunately, the current literature does not contain any results
that permit us to compare S2 and  S3 for a higher number of
bidders. At the same time, we have not been able to reach a
general conclusion with respect to the comparison between S0 and
S3. In the case of only two bidders, by assuming that their costs
are extracted by a random variable uniformly distributed, it is
possible to show
2 that S0 dominates S3, whatever the value of ∆
= qH – qL may be. Nevertheless, we cannot exclude the possibility
that the result might change in the case of different distributions.
To  summarise, if competition is low (N=2), the P may find it
unprofitable to take into account the sellers’ quality during the
awarding phase. Obviously, this extreme conclusion holds only if
quality is an exogenous variable. Conversely, if this element
depends on the sellers effort, then the first price auction contains
a serious drawbacks, because it does not create any incentive to
the provision of quality.
Finally, we want to analyse the sellers’ equilibrium strategy in
game S1. Let us assume that a generic bidder i has cost equal to
the maximum level: ci = 
– c; she will choose the price to bid by
solving the following maximization problem:
by taking into account every possible realization of the couple (qi,
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2 The Author can provide the handwritten calculations upon request.If the seller i hypothesises that her opponent will bid as in a
first price auction, then she knows that pj ≤
– c. On the other hand,
as the sellers’ expected profit can never be negative, pi(
– c) must be
at least as large as 
– c. More specifically, in a first price auction, we
know that pi(
– c) = 
– c and the expected profit of this type of bidder
is equal to 0. Conversely, if the P runs a multidimensional auction,
also this type of bidder can gain a positive expected profit. In fact,
by bidding pi(
– c) > 
– c, she can win with positive probability every
time that her quality will be higher than that of her opponent.
Therefore, if the P adopts  S1, the sellers’ equilibrium strategy
cannot be equal to the one used in a first price auction. This kind
of policy probably induces the sellers to bid in a less aggressive
way. They try to earn a rent that is due not only to the asymmetric
information on costs, but also to sellers’ differentiation according
to the P’s  preferences. 
Unfortunately, it is not possible to calculate the bidders’
equilibrium strategy exactly in this kind of model. Doni et al.
(2008) succeed in arriving at more precise conclusions in a very
similar setting; the main differences are that they represent i) qi
and qj by means of continuous, i.i.d. random variables, and ii) ci
and cj as random variables known by both sellers but unknown
to the P.
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